The Downfall of Corey Patterson

By: Peter Bernstein

The Corey Patterson era in Chicago, such as it was, is over. Patterson, once considered the crown jewel of the Cubs farm system, was sent to the Baltimore Orioles for a couple of middling minor league prospects. The decline of Corey Patterson into perhaps the worst player in major league baseball - well, look at the numbers - as he arguably was during the second half of 2005, is worthy of some analysis. Patterson, you see, wasn’t always terrible. In fact, there was a period of time in which he was reasonably good.

Consider this. In 2003, over the course of 83 games, Patterson hit .298. In a full season in 2004, he batted .266, with 24 home runs, and 91 runs scored. Not an All-Star by any means, but throw in 32 stolen bases and generally good play in centerfield (at that time), and you had someone who you could feel comfortable playing in the everyday line-up. Even in his horrendous 2005 season, he wasn’t always bad. Through the first two months of the season, Patterson was hitting .278.

So, for what’s it worth, there was a stretch of time - a half season, a full season, a third of a season, 290 games total — in which Corey Patterson hit .277, with speed (54 stolen bases) and decent power (47 home runs).

That’s all forgotten now. What is remembered is the Patterson of the last few months of 2005, when he hit just .160 in 76 games, struck out 75 times in 257 at bats, and seemed to show little effort in the field or on the bases.

What happened to Corey Patterson?

First, Patterson was never a disciplined hitter, and even when he was playing better, he was consistently inconsistent. In 2004, Patterson hit .327 in June, .225 in July, .336 in August, and .190 from September 1st onward. Statistics like that indicate that Patterson’s talent was real, but that he lacked the focus or maturity necessary to play well consistently.

But what really happened to Patterson was that he was harmed by the Cubs management, Dusty Baker in particular. Now, I believe that the ultimate responsibility for a player’s development rests with the player himself. But it is clear that Patterson was also misused by the Cubs, and as a result, the Cubs bear considerable responsibility for ruining their “five-tool” prospect.

As Phil Rogers noted in a recent Tribune article, Patterson was obviously brought up to the majors too soon - at 21 - and made into the Cubs everyday centerfielder at age 22, long before he had the necessary experience in the minor leagues. He might never have developed into a player with much knowledge of the strike zone. But another year or two of minor league success might have made it easier for Patterson to withstand the slumps and failures that affect every major league player. Instead, he was tagged as a “can’t miss” prospect, expected by himself and the fans to perform from day one.

More harmful was the insistence by the Cubs and Dusty Baker that Patterson be a top-of-the-order hitter for the Cubs. Anyone who has heard of the on-base percentage statistic knows that Patterson shouldn’t be batting first or second in the line-up. Patterson had speed, but speed doesn’t do much good if you can’t get on base. [I'm not sure how important speed is in any case. How many bases do you need to steal in front of home run hitters like Sosa and Alou or Lee and Ramirez?]

But for much of his career, the Cubs batted Patterson at the top of the order where he went through various batting strategies, none of which seemed to work. He would be aggressive, which isn’t exactly what you want your lead-off man to do, then he would decide to take pitches and fall behind two strikes, then he would try to bunt, then swing away, then it was back to taking a few pitches and falling behind in the count. And through all this, batting at the top of the order not only hurt the team, it also hurt Patterson’s progression.

In his career, Patterson had 1,157 at bats hitting where he shouldn’t - first or second in the line-up - and only 245 at bats hitting where he should - seventh in the line-up. But look at how he performed in those different situations.

Corey Patterson’s Career Statistics in Different Spots in the Line-Up

In every way, Patterson performed better when he hit lower in the line-up. He also scored runs more often (because his higher OBP offset hitting lower in the line-up), drove in more runs per at bat, hit more home runs per at bat, walked more often (although never much) and struck out less often (although always a lot). Prorating his 245 career at-bats as a number seven hitter to a full-season of 550 at bats and Patterson ends up with 27 home runs, and 92 RBIs, which is far more production than a team usually gets from the lower third of its line-up.

But instead, the Cubs and Dusty Baker insisted on batting him at the top of the line-up, where for the most part, he failed, and failed, and failed. And when a naturally talented young player is set-up by his team and his manager to fail, it should come as no surprise that this is exactly what he did.

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Peter Bernstein teaches Economics at DePaul University and is a regular contributor to the Chicago Sports Review. His essay on steroids in baseball is appearing in the NY Times magazine, Front Page. Reach him at pbernstein@rcfecon.com.

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